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Abstract
As part of a recent anti-corruption campaign, the Brazilian government began to audit the
municipal expenditure of federally-transferred funds. Using these audit reports, we construct a
unique data set of political corruption to test whether reelection incentives aﬀect the level of
corruption in a municipality. Consistent with a political economy agency model, we ﬁnd that
mayors who are in their second and ﬁnal term are signiﬁcantly more corrupt than ﬁrst-term
mayors. In particular, second-term mayors on average divert, R$188,431.4 more than ﬁrst-term
mayors, which is approximately 4 percent of the total amount transferred to municipalities. We
also ﬁnd much more pronounced eﬀects among municipalities where the costs of rent-extraction
are lower, and the density of pivotal voters is higher. Our results also illustrate an important
trade-oﬀ: second-term mayors, while more corrupt, provide a higher level of public goods. As
Brazil and other countries continue their decentralization process, our ﬁndings promote the need
for a better understanding of how local institutions can help reduce the incentives for corruption.
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11 Introduction
An important role of elections is to hold incumbent politicians accountable for poor performance.
The possibility of reelection provides politicians with incentives to exert more eﬀort and refrain
from rent-seeking behavior. While there exists an entire class of political economy models that
illustrate this idea, the extent to which reelection incentives actually aﬀect rent-seeking behavior
remains an unexplored empirical question.1 The scarcity of empirical tests of these political-agency
models stems, in large part, to the diﬃculties in measuring corruption. This paper overcomes this
limitation by constructing a unique database of political corruption based on audit reports. We
then exploit the existence of term limits to empirically test whether reelection incentives aﬀect
corruption among mayors of Brazilian municipalities.
In many respects, Brazil provides the ideal setting to test whether political incentives aﬀect
corruption. After the constitution of 1988, municipal governments became responsible for a sub-
stantial share of public services’ provision, particularly in the areas of education and health. With
the devolution of public service delivery to local governments, the federal government transferred
large amounts of federal resources to municipalities.2 With the inﬂux of federal funds increasing
the potential for local capture, it is not too surprising that corruption at the municipal level is now
an overarching concern for Brazil. A recent article in VEJA, a leading Brazilian news magazine,
reports that at least R$7 billion, out of the resources transferred from the federal government to mu-
nicipalities, disappear every year. In response to its systemic corruption, the Brazilian government
began in April of 2003 an ambitious anti-corruption policy to audit the receipts of federal funds
of randomly chosen municipalities. Using these audit reports we construct two objective measures
of corruption at the municipal level: the share of resources misappropriated and the number of
corrupt irregularities. Moreover, because the federal program has audited more than 376 randomly
selected municipalities across Brazil, there is suﬃcient variation to try to understand what explains
political corruption at a local setting.
1See for example Ferejohn (1986), Barro (1970), Banks and Sundaram (1993), Persson and Tabellini (2000), and
Alesina and Tabellini (2004)
2Currently, the 5,560 Brazilian municipalities receive on average $35 billion per year from the federal government,
which represents approximately 15 percent of federal government’s revenue. For comparison, ﬁscal decentralization
in the world is on average 6 percent, while in other similar developing countries such as Mexico, for example, it is
only 3 percent.
2Even with data on corruption, a test of how reelection incentives aﬀect political corruption was
only possible in Brazil after 1998 when a constitutional amendment allowed mayors to run for a
second consecutive term. This amendment allow us to test the eﬀects of reelection incentives by
comparing corruption levels between mayors who are in their ﬁrst term to mayors who are in their
second and ﬁnal term.3
To provide a theoretical framework for our results, we build a simple political agency model
that links rent appropriation to reelection incentives and provides comparative statics with respect
to political competition, media availability, and judicial enforcement. Our ﬁndings are consistent
with this theory. In particular, we ﬁnd that the share of resources misappropriated is 4 percent-
age points higher for second-term mayors than for ﬁrst-term mayors. This indicates that of the
amount of federal funds transferred to municipalities, second-term mayors on average misappropri-
ates R$188,431.4 (approximately US$70,000) more than ﬁrst-term mayors. We also show a positive
association for the number of corrupt irregularities. Compared to ﬁrst-term mayors, second-term
mayors commit 31 percent more irregularities related to corruption. Although we cannot reject the
possibility of omitted-variable bias, our results are remarkably robust to various speciﬁcations and
estimation procedures.
Because there are private costs associated with corruption that directly aﬀect an incumbent’s
reelection incentives, we exploit diﬀerences in the institutional features of the municipality that
aﬀect either the probability of being discovered or prosecuted to further test our model. We ﬁnd
signiﬁcant variation comparing municipalities with and without a media source and municipalities
with and without a judiciary district. Among municipalities with either a radio or newspaper there
is no diﬀerential eﬀect between ﬁrst and second-term mayors. Though we ﬁnd a similar result for
municipalities with a judiciary district, for the municipalities without a judiciary district the eﬀect
of reelection incentives on political corruption is 7 percentage points, which is almost double the
estimate in aggregate.
We also ﬁnd, consistent with the model, that the eﬀect of reelection incentives is much more
pronounced in municipalities where mayor elections were close. The intuition for this result is as
follows. In municipalities with a higher share of pivotal voters, a ﬁrst-term mayor has an incentive
3As we will discuss later in the paper, it is important to understand that we are measuring the reelection incentives
induced by term limits, and not the eﬀects of term limits per se. Our counterfactual is a one term-limit regime and
not the absence of term limits, as in (Besley and Case 1995).
3to further reduce rent-extraction in order to guarantee reelection for his second term. Conversely,
mayors who dictate a municipality will extract maximal rent in the ﬁrst term since reelection is
almost assured.
Although lame duck mayors may have less incentives to refrain from corruption, the reelection
of a mayor also has its beneﬁts. In addition to being more corrupt, second-term mayors on average
commit 17 percent few violations associated with maladministration. This result highlights an
important trade-oﬀ that has received little attention in the corruption literature. Because of a
potential complementarity between corruption and the provision of certain public goods, voters
may have to chose between reelecting a mayor into a position of low accountability and receiving a
higher level of public goods.
The contribution of our paper to the literature is three-fold. This paper represents (to our
knowledge) the ﬁrst empirical test of a class of political-agency models that link reelection incentives
to political corruption. In so doing, we complement two studies that examine how reelection
incentives aﬀect economic policies. Besley and Case (1995) use data from U.S. governors from 1950
to 1986 and ﬁnd that governors who face a binding term limit are more likely to raise taxes and
expenditures, and reduce real state minimum wages. In a related study, List and Sturm (2004)
use data on environmental policy across U.S. states to test a theoretical model where politicians
use secondary policies to attract voters. They ﬁnd that environmental policy diﬀers substantially
between years in which the governor can and cannot be reelected. Our study, while examining
political corruption, diﬀers in another important respect. Whereas these studies identify the eﬀects
of term limits, we measure the eﬀects of reelection incentives created by allowing mayors to run for
a second consecutive term. This is an important distinction because our counterfactual assumption
is not the absence of term limits, but rather allowing only a single term.
This paper also contributes more broadly to a burgeoning empirical literature on what deter-
mines corruption, and more speciﬁcally, the role that political institutions play (see for example:
Traisman (2000); Mocan (2004); Adsera, Boix, and Payne (2003); Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman
(2003); Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2001); Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003)). Our focus
on understanding corruption at a local level is distinct in this strand of the literature. Unlike
the various these studies that rely on cross-country comparisons, we try to understand how local
institutions and political incentives inﬂuence the extent of municipal corruption.
4Our third main contribution is the use of audit data to objectively measure and quantify cor-
ruption.4 In this respect our contribution is similar to Henderson and Kuncoro (2004), Svensson
(2003) and Reinikka and Svensson (2004) in using corruption indicators derived from microdata
for a single country. Diﬀerently from Henderson and Kuncoro (2004) and Svensson (2003) who
look at bribe payments by ﬁrms, we analyze government corruption at the municipality level. In
that sense, our paper is more related to Reinikka and Svensson (2004), who analyze rent capture
in a large educational transfer program in Uganda. They collect data on grants received by schools
using an expenditure tracking survey to study how socioeconomic characteristics matter for the
capture of rents by local oﬃcials and politicians. Our focus is instead on political incentives and
rent-extraction, and our data diﬀers in the important fact that it measures political corruption of
independent municipal governments.
Finally, this paper adds to the discussion of the costs and beneﬁts of decentralization in de-
veloping countries. Although we cannot determine whether decentralization has increased overall
corruption in Brazil, the fact that it has undoubtedly increased corruption at the local level places
an important emphasis on trying to understand how local institutions aﬀect corruption. Our ﬁnd-
ings provide suggestive evidence that the local institution that promote accountability and oversight
may not only reduce political corruption but will minimize the adverse incentives that term limits
seem to create.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework
that links corruption to reelection incentives. It is within this context that we interpret our empirical
results. Section 3 then provides some basic background information on corruption in Brazil and
describes the data. Our empirical strategy is discussed in section 4, and the results follow in section
5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model that provides a basic framework to interpret
our empirical ﬁndings. Our model, which is similar to those presented in Persson and Tabellini
(2000) and Alesina and Tabellini (2004), is an adaptation of the career concern model pioneered by
4Golden and Picci (2004) provides a survey of the potential criticisms associated with the commonly-used subjec-
tive measures of corruption.
5Holmstrom (1999) and later extended by Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999). In this political
context in which elections reward competent or able politicians, incumbents with reelection possi-
bilities have the incentive to extract less rent and thus appear more competent in their provision of
public goods. In eﬀect, incumbents will refrain from maximum rent extraction in the ﬁrst period in
order to increase their reelection chances and the possibility of full (unconstrained) rent extraction
in the second period.
The basic intuition for this result is simple. The objective of voters is to elect the candidate
with the highest competency level since this assures them of the highest utility. The incumbent’s
ability is unknown to the voters, and only revealed to the incumbent after he chooses his level of
rent-seeking for the ﬁrst period.5 With voters left to infer his level of ability, the incumbent has
an incentive to refrain from rent-seeking to appear more competent than average and thus assure
himself of reelection. This leads to an equilibrium where politicians in their last term of oﬃce will
on average extract more rent compared with their ﬁrst term in oﬃce. The details of this intuition
are what follow.
Consider a two-period model, where voters have preferences over private income y and a publicly
provided good gt. The utility of a representative voter Ut in period t = 1,2 is expressed as,
Ut = y(1 − ¯ τ) + αgt. (1)
The exogenous parameter α is assumed to be greater than 1, and taxes are ﬁxed at ¯ τ.
Though public goods are the sole policy instrument, politicians can engage in rent-seeking be-
havior. We require that the government balances its budget in both periods, so the appropriation
of nonnegative rents rt by the politician eﬀectively reduces the amount of public goods and con-
sequently lowers voter welfare. The government budget constraint determines the level of public
goods as,
gt = θ + ¯ τy − rt. (2)
The random variable θ captures the politician’s competence in providing public goods and is dis-
tributed from a normal distribution with mean ¯ θ and variance σ.6 All else held constant, a more
5The fact that the incumbent does not know his own competency level is admittedly a strong assumption. Banks
and Sundaram (1993) and Rogoﬀ (1990) cast this agency problem as an adverse selection problem to relax this
assumption, and ﬁnd the same general result.
6One could easily relax the assumption that a politician’s competency aﬀects the provision of public goods in an
additive manner and maintain similar results.
6competent politicians eﬀectively increases the government budget constraint to provide more public
goods.
Politicians value rents according to a well-behaved, concave function, R(rt), but also experience
some disutility, C(rt), stemming from the transaction costs associated with rent appropriation. The
disutility of rent extraction increases with the amount of rent appropriated and in a convex manner,
i.e. C0 > 0,C00 > 0. To insure that voters have the incentive to reelect competent incumbents, we
also assume that the maximum level of rents that a politician can extract is strictly below the total
available tax revenue. We can now state the objective of the incumbent politician in period 1 as,
VI = R(r1) − C(r1) + PrIβ(R(r2) − C(r2)), (3)
where β ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor and PrI is the probability of reelection.
The timing of this game is as follows:
• In period 1, the incumbent politician chooses the level of rent appropriation, r1 before knowing
his competency level θ.
• Nature then reveals the value of θ, which determines the level of public goods, g1. Observing
only their own utility, voters are forced to make inference on the incumbent’s competence
level.
• Elections are held.
• If the incumbent wins, his competence θ is maintained. Otherwise, the challenger enters oﬃce
with a competency level randomly drawn from the same normal distribution.
• In period 2, rents r2 are set, thus determining the level of public goods, g2.
Because the game ends in period 2 and there are no incentives to behave altruistically, the elected
politician will set rents r2 to equate marginal beneﬁts to marginal costs, i.e. R0(r2) = C0(r2).7
Unable to induce politicians away from optimal rent extraction in period 2, voters will seek to elect
the most competent candidate since doing so provides them with the highest utility.
With this objective and having observed the current level of public goods g1, voters will properly
recognize that politicians maximize equation 3 and form expectations about the level of current
7Alesina and Spears (1988) show that lame-duck politicians may not fully extract rent if they consider the reelection
probabilities of their own party.
7rents, re
1. Also realizing that the alternative to reelecting the incumbent is to elect a politician
with an expected competency level of ¯ θ, voters will hold the incumbent accountable to a threshold
level of public good provision in the ﬁrst period that is equal to y¯ τ + ¯ θ − re
1. If the level of public
goods g1 is higher than this threshold, implying a higher expected competence level than ¯ θ, the





1 if g1 ≥ y¯ τ + ¯ θ − re
1,
0 otherwise
From the incumbent’s perspective, his period 1 decision is to optimally choose rents r1, while
considering the fact that increasing rents in period 1 will lower his probability of reelection and
thus his expected future beneﬁts. Formally, this maximization problem can expressed as:
Max
r1




s.t. gt = y¯ τ + θ − rt for t = 1,2
where r∗
2 is the optimal level of rent extraction in period 2. After substituting in the constraints
and rearranging slightly, we can reformulate the statement to:
Max
r1




Given our distributional assumption for θ, the equilibrium rent extraction r∗
1 is implicitly deﬁned
by the ﬁrst-order condition:










2)) = 0 (4)
In equilibrium, voters’ expectation of rents must equal the incumbent’s optimal choice of rents, i.e.
re
1 = r1. Equation 4 thus simpliﬁes to:
R0(r1) − C0(r1) = ηβ(R(r∗
2) − C(r∗
2)), (5)
where η = 1
σ
√
2π is the density of the normal distribution of θ evaluated at its mean.
Comparing the equilibrium choice of rents of the two periods provides the main result of this
model and the motivation for our empirical test. Politicians in their last term of oﬃce will on
average extract more rent compared with their ﬁrst term in oﬃce. To see this, ﬁrst deﬁne the
function Ψ(rt) = R0(rt) − C0(rt), which given our assumptions about R(·) and C(·), is a concave
8function. From equation 5, and with ηβ(R(r∗
2)−C(r∗
2)) > 0, it holds that Ψ(r∗
1) > Ψ(r∗
2) = 0. The
concavity of Ψ(·) thus implies that r∗
2 > r∗
1.
Note that equation 5 suggests other implications of this model that we explore in the data. The
higher the uncertainty in the election, as measured in η, the lower the equilibrium rents r∗
1, and the
relatively higher rent extraction in period 2. Similarly, the higher the ”rent-proﬁt”, either because
of higher revenues or lower transaction costs, implies a higher relative rent extraction in the second
period.
3 Background and Data Construction
To understand how reelection incentives aﬀect the level of political corruption, we assemble a unique
database of municipal corruption spanning the years 2000 to 2003. We use reports from random-
ized audits done by the Brazilian government to construct objective measures of a municipality’s
corruption level during this period. In this section we ﬁrst provide some background on political
corruption at the municipal level and then describe how we used the audits reports to construct
measures of corruption.
3.1 Descriptive Evidence on Political Corruption Schemes
With a series of well-publicized federal corruption scandals, including the impeachment of ex-
President Collor de Mello, much of our understanding of corruption and its institutional sources in
Brazil, has been limited at the national scale (see for (Fleischer 1997); (Fleischer 2002); (Geddes
and Neto 1999); (Barry Ames 1987)). Corruption at the municipal level, which has increased
substantially as result of the Brazil’s decentralization, has received much less attention.
Local corruption in Brazil assumes a variety of familiar forms. Illegal procurement practices,
diversion of funds, and over-invoicing for goods and services are among the most common ways
local politicians ﬁnd to appropriate resources (?).
While Brazilian law requires a competitive bidding process with at least three participants
for any project in excess of R$80,000 per year, the municipality of Itapetinga in the state of
Bahia, for example, highlights one of the many ways local mayors have manipulated the public
procurement process. In 2002 and 2003, the federal government transferred to Itapetinga R$
389,000 (US$110,000) for the purchase of school lunches. In 12 out of the 16 calls for bids, only
9one bid was ever supplied. It was later discovered that each call for bids was posted only one hour
prior to its deadline, and surprisingly only a ﬁrm owned by the mayor’s brother posted within the
time limit. This same scheme was uncovered for other social programs in the areas of education
and health.
In other procurement bids, irregularities appear because friendly or family ﬁrms have either
beneﬁtted from insider information on the value of the project, or certain restrictions have been
imposed to limit the number of potential bidders. An example from Cacule, Bahia, illustrates
this. The call for bids on the construction of a sports complex speciﬁed as a minimum requirement
for participation that all ﬁrms needed to have at least R$100,000 in capital and a speciﬁc quality
control certiﬁcation. Only one ﬁrm called Geo-Technik Ltda., which was to discovered to have
provided kickbacks to the mayor, met these qualiﬁcations.
While some procurement practices manipulate the process in favor of ﬁrms that oﬀer potential
kickbacks, other strategies are more blatant forms of fund diversions. For example in the munici-
pality of S˜ ao Francisco do Conde, again in Bahia, a health contract of R$308,000 was awarded to
a phantom ﬁrm: a ﬁrm that only exists on paper. And in other contracts, although existing ﬁrms
did win the bid, none of them were even aware that they had participated in the bidding process.
The local administration used these ﬁrm’s names in false receipts for public goods that were never
provided.
Another common form of corruption is for mayors to divert funds intended for education and
health projects towards the purchase of cars, fuel, apartments, or payment of their friends’ salaries.
In some cases, the mayor himself is a direct beneﬁciary. For example, in Paranhos, Mato Grosso
do Sul, R$189,000 was paid to implement a rural electriﬁcation project. As it turns out, one of the
farms beneﬁtted by the project was in fact owned by the mayor.
3.2 The Construction of Corruption Indicators
In April of 2003, the Controladoria Geral da Uni˜ ao (CGU) - an agency responsible for auditing
the use of federal resources - started an unprecedented anti-corruption program designed to au-
dit the application and execution of federal funds transferred to municipalities. Every month the
CGU sends approximately 10 auditors to 50 randomly-selected municipalities across the 26 states
to examine the allocation of federally-transferred funds, to inspect the quality and completeness of
10public works, and to conduct interviews with key members of civil society.8 These federal transfers,
typically earmarked for speciﬁc projects or public works, are examined for such irregularities as
diversion of funds, noncompetitive bidding in the procurement contracts, cost-padding, and incom-
plete or non-utilization. Each visit lasts seven days on average, and results in a detailed report
documenting any irregularity associated with either the federal transfers or federally-funded social
programs. Reports are subsequently sent to the federal judiciary system for potential prosecution.
It is with these reports that we construct our objective indicators of political corruption and study
how reelection incentives aﬀect these measures.
Reports are available for the 376 municipalities that were randomly selected across the ﬁrst 8
lotteries.9 Contained in each report are the total amount of federal funds that was transferred to
the current administration and thus audited, as well as, an itemized list describing each irregularity,
in what sector it occurred (e.g. health, education, etc.), and in most cases the amount of funds
involved.
Based on our readings (and that of an independent person), we then codiﬁed these reports into
several categories; some indicating corruption while others simply exposing poor administration.
A couple examples will provide insight into our coding procedures.
Consider for example how the municipality of Malhada de Pedras in the interior of Bahia
allocated funds from the Federal program FUNDEF - a program designed to pay for the costs of
primary education in a municipality:
1) Fraud, diversion of funds, and falsiﬁed receipts associated with the re-
sources of FUNDEF: the auditors identiﬁed R$100,000 in falsiﬁed receipts, emitted
over the last 3 years, to justify expenditure associated with FUNDEF. All of the 12 ﬁrms
that were indicated on the receipts as providers of the products, conﬁrmed that they
had never conducted business with the administration. The auditors also conﬁrmed that
R$610,000 was paid to individuals without any direct ties to the educational system.
We coded this irregularity as a diversion of funds in the area of education, with an amount to-
8It is important to mention that these auditors are hired based on a public examination, and prior to visiting the
municipality receive extensive training on the speciﬁcities of the sampled municipality. Also, there is a supervisor for
each team of auditors.
9Only 26 municipalities were selected in the ﬁrst lottery. In May of 2004, starting with the tenth lottery, the CGU
increased the number of municipalities sampled to 60.
11talling R$710,000. The municipality of Varzea, in the state of Para´ ıba, provides an example of
maladministration.
1) Maladministration in the use of resources from the Family Health Pro-
gram (Programa de Saude da Familia): The municipality used R$92,500 to pay
medical doctors from the Association of Protective Motherhood and Childhood As-
sistance, a productivity premium. Although used for health-related expenses, these
resources were intended to be used in the area of preventive medicine, and in particu-
lar to defray costs associated with the programs: Family Health, Oral health, and the
Community Health Agents Program.
We classiﬁed this violation as poor administration in the area of health, with a value of R$92,500.
In all, we coded the irregularities into 11 categories: diversion of funds, illegal procurement
contracts, over-invoicing, incomplete public works, non-existent or non-functioning social council,
mismanagement of a social program, abandoned project (white elephant), clientelism, failure to
spend allocated budget, poor administration, and other. For each irregularity we distinguish the
sector in which it was found, and its amount when available.
Among these various categories of irregularities, we combine the incidences of funds diversion,
illegal procurement practices, and over-invoicing to construct an aggregate indicator of municipal
corruption. These practices have not only been shown to be the most common forms of corruption
in Brazil, but in many instances they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In eﬀect, over-invoicing
and illegal procurement practices often serve as vehicles for funds diversion. The combination of
these three categories is what we consider best captures the municipality’s corruption level.
With our aggregated corruption indicator, we deﬁne two measures of political corruption at
the municipal level. The ﬁrst measure computes the total amount of resources related to our
corrupt activities, expressed as a share of the total amount of resources audited. Our second
measure simply counts the number of irregularities related to corruption. There are at least two
reasons why we calculate alternative measures of corruption. First, although correlated with our
ﬁrst measure of corruption (the correlation coeﬃcient is 0.51), the number of corrupt irregularities
helps to distinguish whether second-term mayors also engage in more corrupt transactions. Second,
in coding the amount of resource deviated or involved in an illegal procurement, a dollar amount was
12not always available in some of the audit reports.10 While coding these cases as zero underestimates
the amount of corruption, this could create a bias for testing reelection incentives if the cases
occurred disproportionately for ﬁrst-term mayors. By using this count measure we include these
irregularities and thus avoid this potential bias.11
Summary statistics for each of our categories, including the corruption indicator, are displayed
in Table 1.12 As seen in column 1, 54 percent of the municipalities have performed an illegal
procurement practice, and at least 48 percent of the municipalities have diverted some type of
funds. Over-invoicing, another source of corruption, is found much less frequently, occurring in
only 6 percent of our sample. After combining these indicators, we see that 73 percent of the
municipalities have had at least one incidence of corruption. Moreover, those administrations
that do commit an act of corruption average around 2.35 corrupt violations, which represents 35
percent of the irregularities found. At an average of R$135,000 per violation, these corrupt practices
represent 9.1 percent of the total amount amount audited.
Among the other types of irregularities, the misuse or mismanagement of a social program
appears to be an important problem for the federal government and the eﬃcacy of its social policies.
Approximately 39 percent of the municipalities have mismanaged at least one of its federally-
funded social program. Surprisingly, explicit acts of clientelism were found in only 7 percent of the
sample, whereas incidences of poor administration are commonly found in over 67 percent of the
municipality.
Columns 5-8 in Table 1 display the primary sectors over which these irregularities are dis-
tributed. Both in aggregate and for the corruption indicator, we see that over 50 percent of these
irregularities occur in the areas of education and health: sectors that were decentralized during
of the 1990s. Though this table cannot distinguish whether corruption occurs relatively more in
health and education because the federal funds are concentrated in these areas or because the
activities within these sectors are easier to corrupt, there does appear to be a lack of oversight.
Of the 30 percent of the municipalities that do not have a functioning or existent council, roughly
50 percent of these dysfunctional councils are related to health or education. We also ﬁnd that
10Only 11 percent of the incidences of illegal procurement practices and funds diversion did not have a value.
11If anything we are underestimating the eﬀect of reelection incentives on the share of total resources associated
with corruption, because the proportion of these irregularities is 6 percentage points higher for second-term mayors.
12Summary statistics are computed for the 367 municipalities that constitute our estimation sample. The 13
municipalities were excluded for not having a full set of explanatory variables.
13abandoned projects (or white elephants), which are found in 10 percent of the municipalities, are
mostly associated with agriculture.
To now get a sense for how reelection incentive may aﬀect these various irregularities, Table 2
compares these indicators between municipalities with mayors in their ﬁrst-term to municipalities
with mayors in their second-term. Compared to municipalities with ﬁrst-term mayors, the number
of irregularities found in each of our 3 categories of corruption (diversion of funds, illegal procure-
ment practices, and over-invoicing) is higher in municipalities governed by second-term mayors. On
average, second-term mayors commit .23 more irregularities in both diversion of funds and illegal
procurement practices, although only procurement practices are measured with much precision.
A comparison of our aggregated indicator of corruption provides some preliminary evidence in
support of our theoretical predictions. Mayors in their ﬁnal term of oﬃce commit 0.48 more irreg-
ularities related to corruption than ﬁrst-term mayors, a diﬀerence that is signiﬁcant at 90 percent
conﬁdence. When we measure corruption, using the share of the transfers audited, the last set of
rows of Table 2 tell a similar story. Second-term mayors are on average 3.7 percent more corrupt
than ﬁrst-term mayors; a diﬀerence which is signiﬁcant at a 95 percent level of conﬁdence. Notice
also that illegal procurement practices drives much of the diﬀerence between ﬁrst and second-term
mayors that we observed in our corruption indicators. Just in terms of procurement practices, the
share of resources audited that were found to be irregular is 3.1 percent higher for second-term
mayors than for ﬁrst-term mayors.
The table also shows that while more corrupt, second term mayors are on average better ad-
ministrators than ﬁrst-term mayors. This diﬀerence could be attributed to both the experience
gained in oﬃce and the fact that second-term mayors could represent a select-group of more ad-
ministratively able individuals. Regardless of the explanation, as seen in column 3, municipalities
with a second-term mayors commit fewer irregularities in tending to administrative matters, and
to a lesser extent have less dysfunctional councils and better-managed social programs.
3.3 Data on Municipal Characteristics
Three other data sources, obtained from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Insti-
tuto Brasileiro de Geograﬁa e Estat´ ıstica (IBGE)), complement our political corruption variables.
The richness of these data allows us to control for several municipal characteristics, whose absence
14might otherwise confound our estimates.
Our measures of per capita income were obtained from the 2000 population census. Per capita
income is simply measured as total household income divided by household size. Using sampling
weights, we then constructed for each municipality average per capita income and a Gini coeﬃcient.
Our second complementary data source from IBGE is a municipality survey, Perﬁl dos Mu-
nic´ ıpios Brasileiros: Gest˜ ao P´ ublica, conducted in 1999. These data characterize various aspects of
the public administration, including the existence of laws which govern its budgetary and planning
procedures. The survey also provides structural features of the municipality such as whether it has
a newspaper or municipal police, etc.
Finally, results from 2000 mayor elections are available from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
(TSE). These data contain vote totals for each candidate by municipality, along with various indi-
vidual characteristics, such as the candidate’s gender, education, occupation, and party aﬃliation.
We use this information to construct the mayor’s winning margin and various other measures of
electoral performance.
Table 3 compares diﬀerences in mean characteristics of municipalities with a ﬁrst-term mayor
and municipalities with a second-term mayor. Despite our lack of experimental design and need
to assume selection on observable characteristics, it is useful to understand what determinants of
corruption if any, are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the municipalities with ﬁrst-term and second-
term mayors. Along several observable characteristics, there appear to be few diﬀerences between
municipalities with second and ﬁrst-term mayors. Out of 46 observable characteristics of the munic-
ipality only 6 are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at a 95 percent level of conﬁdence.13 There is a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in their margin of victory in the 2000 municipal elections between ﬁrst and second-term
mayor. This is not too surprising given that incumbents tend to have an advantage in elections.
The other important diﬀerences between municipalities with ﬁrst and second-term mayor are the
proportion of the population that is literate and per capita income, which are presumably corre-
lated. Municipalities with second term mayors have a lower per capita income of roughly R$27,
which is about 10 percent of the monthly minimum wage.
13For the sake of space, we only report the 22 main variables, and 3 of those are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. See the
table’s footnote for a list of the other variables.
154 Empirical Strategy
Our main objective is to test whether the reelection incentives created from allowing mayors to be
reelected for a second term aﬀect the level of political corruption in a municipality. Exploiting the
fact that mayors are limited to two consecutive terms in oﬃce, we compare the corruption level
between ﬁrst-term mayors and second-term mayors. Our theoretical model predicts that ﬁrst-term
mayors who still face reelection incentives should on average be less corrupt than second-term
mayors. Here, we present the empirical speciﬁcation used to test this hypothesis, and discuss the
assumptions needed for a causal interpretation of our results.
We estimate the eﬀects of reelection incentives using the following econometric speciﬁcation,
rij = βIij + Xijδ + ηj + εij, (6)
where rij is the level of corruption for municipality i in state j, and Iij indicates whether the mayor
is in his second and ﬁnal term. The vector Xij is a set of municipal and mayor characteristics
that determine the municipality’s level of corruption, ηj represents state intercepts, and εij denotes
unobserved (to the econometrician) municipal and mayor characteristics thought to determine
corruption. Under this speciﬁcation, with the standard yet substantive assumption that E[Iijεij] =
0, the coeﬃcient β measures the true eﬀect of reelection incentives on corruption levels.
The intuition underlying this identiﬁcation assumption and our estimate of β can be had by
considering the ideal research design. Consider a controlled experiment that randomly assigns the
possibility of reelection to a second term across politicians before the start of their ﬁrst adminis-
tration and then record corruption levels after the ﬁrst term. To be concrete suppose that without
the possibility of reelection lame duck mayors commit a level of corruption equal to ¯ r, and in mu-
nicipalities that allow reelection for to a second term, corruption in the ﬁrst term is equal r1.14 In
this randomized experiment, the simple diﬀerence ¯ r − r1 captures the average eﬀect of being able
to be reelected to a second and ﬁnal term on the level of corruption.
What this experiment illustrates is that the coeﬃcient β measures exactly this diﬀerence under
the following two counterfactual assumptions. First, second-term mayors behave similarly to mayors
who face a single-term limit. And secondly, conditional on observed characteristics, ﬁrst-term
mayors behaved similar to second-term mayors when in their ﬁrst term.
14Note that if reelected to the second term the mayor by assumption commits a level of corruption equal to ¯ r.
16Note that because our counterfactual is not the absence of term limits, we are not capturing
the eﬀects of term limits, as in the case of Besley and Case (1995). We could however interpret
β as a term-limit eﬀect under the strong assumption that corruption among mayors in their ﬁrst
term is equal to the corruption level of mayors in the absence of term limits. But this assumption
is violated in most political agency models precisely because reelection incentives for ﬁrst-term
mayors are higher in municipalities with a term limit than those without. Hence, because reelection
incentives are higher among these municipalities, ﬁrst-term mayors have the incentive to lower their
corruption level relative to mayors in municipalities without term limits.
5 Empirical Results
This section provides evidence consistent with our theoretical model. Our results show that mayors
who face a binding term limit are associated with higher levels of corruption, measured in both
the share of resources appropriated and the number of corrupt irregularities. These ﬁndings are
robust to various speciﬁcations and estimation techniques. We also explore variation in the eﬀects of
reelection incentives and ﬁnd that it is larger among municipalities where the cost of rent extraction
is lower, and where the density of pivotal voters is higher; again all consistent with our theoretical
predictions. We conclude this section with a discussion of potential threats to our identiﬁcation
assumptions.
Basic Results on Corruption
Table 4 presents OLS estimates of the eﬀects of reelection incentives on the share of resources that
were corrupted.15 Column 1 reports the unadjusted relationship between whether the mayor is in
his second-term and the share of funds appropriated, and the remaining columns correspond to
speciﬁcations that include additional sets of controls. Our base speciﬁcation presented in column 2
controls for mayor characteristics, demographic characteristics of the municipality, and a measure
of political competition. Whereas column 3 simply extends this speciﬁcation to include municipal
characteristics that are thought to constrain the practice of corruption in a municipality. Our
15Without any evidence of corruption in 31 percent of the sample, we also estimate a Tobit model to account for
the left censoring at zero. Estimate of the marginal eﬀects are reported in Table 11 of the annex. Conditional on the
censoring, the marginal eﬀects for the Tobit are similar to the OLS estimates.
17full speciﬁcation reported in column 4, which also corresponds to equation 6, simply adds state
intercepts to the speciﬁcation reported in column 3. Sample sizes and R2 are reported below. The
sample has been restricted to the non-missing observations of the various control variables, so as
to keep its size constant across speciﬁcations; this adjustment does not aﬀect the general results.
From the bivariate relationship in column 1, we see that second-term mayors are associated with
a 3.4 percentage point increase in corruption. At a baseline of 0.062, this estimate represents an
eﬀect of 54.8 percent. Alternatively if we consider that on average R$5,542,210 were transferred to
these municipalities, lame-duck mayors appropriate R$188,431.4 more than ﬁrst-term mayors. As
seen in the other columns, the inclusion of additional controls has virtually no eﬀect on the point
estimate. For example in column 4, which controls for state intercepts and various mayor and
municipal characteristics, the estimated eﬀect while slightly larger is statistically indistinguishable
from the estimate of the unadjusted regression.
Several characteristics that a priori we would expect to be correlated with corruption are un-
fortunately not robust to the inclusion of state ﬁxed-eﬀects. In columns 2 and 3, we see that both
the education of the mayor and the proportion of the population that is literate are both negatively
correlated with corruption. While the proportion of the population that lives in the urban sector is
positively related to corruption. Surprisingly, political corruption is not associated with either per
capita income, income inequality, or the number of eﬀective candidates in the 2000 mayor election.
The inclusion of variables that limit the practice of corruption, such as having a local radio station
or being a judiciary district appear to have a negative eﬀect on corruption but are unfortunately not
measured with much precision. When we use within state variation to identify the other determi-
nants of corruption, we ﬁnd that many of these estimates loose precision and become insigniﬁcant.
The eﬀect of reelection incentives is the exception, as the point estimate increases to 0.040 and
remains statistically signiﬁcant at a 5 percent level.
For our second measure of corruption, Table 5 reports the OLS estimates of the eﬀect of reelec-
tion incentives on the number of irregularities found to be corrupt.16 Column 1 in Table 5 presents
16Given that our dependent variable is constructed from count data, we also estimate a poisson model. Estimates
of the marginal eﬀects call be found in Table 12 of the annex. The marginal eﬀects for the bivariate regression,
column 1, are in fact similar to the OLS estimates. However as we add more explanatory variables, the marginal
eﬀects from the Poisson, which unlike OLS are functions of the other control variables, diﬀer slightly from the OLS
estimates. As reported in columns 3-5, the marginal eﬀects are stable across speciﬁcations.
18the bivariate relationship between reelection incentives and the number of corrupt irregularities.
Although we ﬁnd that second-term mayors are more corrupt than ﬁrst-term mayors, an underlying
concern would be that municipalities with second-term mayors may have had more items audited.
Without knowing this information, we proxy for this scale-eﬀect in column 2 by controlling for the
total number of irregularities (i.e. poor administration, poor functioning councils, etc) found in the
municipalities.17 Compared to column 1, the estimated eﬀect remains statistically indistinguish-
able and signiﬁcant at a 95 percent level of conﬁdence. The estimate in column 2 implies that
second-term mayors are associated with a 0.534 increase in the number of corrupt irregularities.
At a baseline of 1.73 corrupt violations, this represents a 31.4 percent increase. This estimate is
robust to the inclusion of other controls, speciﬁcally mayor characteristics, demographics, political
competition, proxies for cost of corruption, and state ﬁxed-eﬀects.
As a test of the robustness of our estimates, Table 6 presents the estimated eﬀect of reelection
incentives using a bias-adjusted matching estimator (Abadie and Imbens 2004). The ﬂexibility
of the matching estimator allows us to compare ﬁrst-term mayors to second-term mayors with
similar observable characteristics. Although compared to the regression analysis the identiﬁcation
assumptions are similar, the matching estimator does not assume a functional form and does not
extrapolate over areas of uncommon support in the observable characteristics.
The ﬁrst three columns of table 6 correspond to eﬀects of reelection incentives on the share
of resources related to corruption. Whereas, the second set of columns, columns 4-6, report the
estimated eﬀect for the incidence of corruption-related irregularities. For each measure of corrup-
tion, Table 6 presents three diﬀerent speciﬁcations which diﬀer in the variables that are matched.
For both measures of corruption, the point estimates are consistent with those presented in the
regression analysis and measured much more precisely. For example with the full set of control,
the eﬀect of term-limits on corruption-related expenditure is 0.035 percentage points, compared to
0.040 percentage points in our regression analysis.
17The fundamental assumption is that total number of irregularities is a weakly monotonic function of total number
of items audited.
19Local Context and Reelection Incentives
In table 7, we explore the extent to which this second-term eﬀect varies according to local context.
According to the model presented in section 2, we expect second-term mayors to be relatively
more corrupt in municipalities where the cost of rent extraction is lower, and where the density
of pivotal voters is higher. Table 7 reports the second-term eﬀects on the share of total resources
related to corruption for 3 types of variables chosen to capture this variation. Two channels aﬀect
the expected cost of corruption. One is the probability of getting caught, and the second is the
probability of getting punished. We use whether or not a municipality has a radio and newspaper
to proxy for the probability of getting caught in a corruption scheme. Whereas we distinguish the
existence of a judiciary district in a municipality as a potential measure of the probability of getting
punished. To proxy for the density of pivotal voters we borrow a commonly used measure from the
political science literature: the mayor’s margin of victory in the previous election (see for example
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2003)).
Column 1 presents the second-term eﬀect interacted with the indicator for whether a judiciary
district exists in the municipality. The presence of a judiciary reduces the corruption diﬀerential
between ﬁrst-term and second-term mayors. This suggests that in municipality with a judiciary
district, the costs of corruption are suﬃciently high that there is no incentive to reduce ﬁrst-
period corruption in order to improve reelection possibilities. Column 2 and 3 present the second-
term eﬀect interacted with the existence of local media. We ﬁnd that in municipalities without a
newspaper, mayors that do not have reelection incentives are 11.2 percentage point more corrupt
than those that do. This estimate, which is 7.3 percentage points higher than the aggregate
eﬀect, suggests that in municipalities with no newspapers second-term mayors divert on average
R$616,000 more than ﬁrst-term mayors. Using the existence of a radio station as our measure of
media availability provides similar yet attenuated results.
In column 4, we test how the second-term eﬀect varies with the degree of political competition
in the municipality. Among municipalities where 2000 elections were highly competitive, which
corresponds to a win margin value of 0.021 (10 percent of the sample), the second-term eﬀect is
.064, which is 1.6 times the average estimate. And if we consider the other 10 percent of the
municipalities where the elections were less competitive, given by a win margin of 0.35, the second
term is 0.001. This result shows that municipalities characterized by low competition exhibit no
20diﬀerential eﬀect in rent-extraction between ﬁrst and second- term mayors. First-term mayors with
an extreme electoral advantage can aﬀord to be as corrupt as a lame-duck mayor since his reelection
is practically guaranteed.
A Trade-oﬀ between Public Good Provision and Corruption
We have provided suggestive evidence that second-term mayors, who no longer face reelection
incentives, tend to be more corrupt than ﬁrst-term mayors. And yet, more corruption does not
necessarily imply less provision of certain public goods. The descriptive statistics presented in
Table 2 do seem to indicate that second-term mayors, while more corrupt, are also better public
administrators. This complementarity presents an interesting trade-oﬀ. Voters must consider
reelecting a mayor into a position of low accountability in exchange for more or better quality
public goods. Here we examine this association between second-term mayors and better public
administration more closely.
Table 8 presents the OLS estimates for the eﬀect of being a second-term mayor on the number of
violations associated with mismanagement. We deﬁne mismanagement as the number of violations
associated with poor administration, mismanagement of a social program, failure to spend allocated
budget, and unﬁnished public works. The speciﬁcations and sample in columns 1-5 replicate those
presented in Table 5.
For each speciﬁcation there is a strong negative association between being a second-term mayor
and the number of violations associated with mismanagement. For example, in our most general
speciﬁcation (column 5) second-term mayors are associated with 0.414 less violations than ﬁrst-
term mayors.18 At a baseline of 2.37 violations, this eﬀect represents a 17.5 percent diﬀerence
between ﬁrst and second-term mayors.
Hence, even though second-term mayors are associated with a 31.4 percent increase in corrupt
violations, with second-term mayors providing, on average, better social programs, more complete
public works, and better overall administration, a tradeoﬀ clearly exists. Voters must decide be-
tween between reelecting a mayor that as a lame duck has the incentive to extract maximum rent
but on the other hand is a more capable provider of public goods. Interestingly enough in Brazil’s
fascinating political history, this tradeoﬀ has even been communicated in a political campaign. The
18The marginal eﬀects estimated from a Poisson model, once again provide very similar results.
21ex-mayor of S˜ ao Paulo during the 1950’s campaigned on the slogan ”Rouba, mas faz [Steals but
does things] (Laranjeira 1999). And recently this slogan has been applied to another ex-mayor of
S˜ ao Paulo, Paulo Maluf, who despite being accused of corruption in the 1990’s reran for mayor in
the 2004 elections.
Although second-term mayors appear to be better providers of public goods, in the absence of
repeated observations across time it is not clear what accounts for this correlation. Are second-
term mayors able to provide better public goods because of the job experience, or are we simply
capturing a selection bias associated with the fact that second-term mayors are reelected politicians.
Table 9 attempts to get at this distinction. Here we re-estimate each speciﬁcation with a sample
that excludes ﬁrst-term mayors that do not get reelected in the 2004 elections. If conditional
on observable characteristics, second-term mayors have on average similar innate administrative
abilities as the group of ﬁrst-term mayors that were also reelected in 2004, then we can attribute any
diﬀerences in the number of violations associated with mismanagement to mostly work experience.
What Table 9 demonstrates is that even using this restricted sample second-term mayors are
still associated with less violations in the provision of public goods. Compared to ﬁrst-term mayors,
lame duck mayors commit .454 fewer violations (see column 5). Considering the previous estimate
of -.414 in Table 8, this provides some suggestive evidence that voters do face a tradeoﬀ between
more potential corruption and reelecting a mayor with four years of on-the-job experience.
Estimation Concerns
Even though our general results are consistent with an important class of political agency models,
mayors are unfortunately not randomly assigned to one or two term limits. As such, omitted-
variable bias remains a central concern, and any unobserved characteristic of the municipality or
its mayor that both determines corruption and is correlated with reelection will bias our results.
Here, we describe some alternative explanations for our results.
One potential source of bias is the unobserved competency or ability of a mayor. If in an
alternative theoretical framework a mayor’s competency increases his reelection probability and
enables him to be more corrupt, then our estimate, in capturing the mayor’s competency, would
be biased upwards. There are however, at least two reasons why unobserved competency may
not be driving our results. First, as seen in tables 4 and 5 the second-term eﬀect is robust to the
22inclusion of several mayor characteristics, such as: age, education, party aﬃliation, civil status, and
gender. The second reason is provided in Table 10. To try to control for a mayor’s competency or
administrative abilities, we include in our regressions the number of irregularities associated with
poor administration, misuse of a social program, nonexistent/dysfunctional councils, and unﬁnished
public works. Columns 1-4 of Table 10 present the eﬀect of reelection incentives on the share of
resources found to be corrupted. The regressions shown here use similar speciﬁcations as those
presented in table 4, with the exception that we now try to proxy for the mayor’s competency
level. As the table shows all four types of administrative irregularities are negatively associated
with corruption, but only the misuse or mismanagement of social programs is signiﬁcant at a 90
percent level of conﬁdence. And while these estimates do lend some support to idea that a mayor’s
ability may aﬀect the level of corruption, our estimates of the second-term eﬀect are in general
unaﬀected. Only in the bivariate regression, column 1, do we lose some precision.
A related source of potential bias is if politicians learn or establish networks over time that
allow them to become more corrupt. If this were the case, our estimates would not necessarily
reﬂect the lack of reelection incentives for second-term mayors but rather the corruption knowhow
that second-term mayors have accumulated. Without more data it is diﬃcult to test our model
against a learning model.
Our inability to control for informal institutions maybe another source of bias. If for example
diﬀerences in the degree of clientelism or patronage within municipality are not captured in the
diﬀerences of the various municipal characteristics that we control for, then our estimated second-
term eﬀect maybe upwardly biased. This notwithstanding, we would like to note that our estimates
are robust to the inclusion of state ﬁxed-eﬀects, and in the context of Brazil, there is undoubtedly
much more variation in informal institution across states, than within states.
Finally, there is at least two reasons to believe that our estimates represent lower bounds. First,
lame duck mayors may have aspirations for other political oﬃces. And second, as in Alesina and
Spears (1988) lame-duck mayor may also consider the reelection probabilities of their own party or
a candidate that they have indicated. In both cases, lame duck mayors would have an incentive to
refrain from complete rent extraction and consequently our results would be biased downward.
236 Conclusions
In April 2003, Brazil launched an ambitious anti-corruption campaign designed to audit the ap-
plication and execution of federal funds transferred to municipalities. We exploit the reports of
these randomly audited municipalities to examine the link between reelection incentives and the
extent of political corruption. Our results are broadly consistent with a class of political agency
models that suggest that the possibility of reelection provides incentives for incumbents to reduce
rent extraction in their ﬁrst term in order to increase their likelihood of reelection to a second term.
In particular, we ﬁnd that second-term mayors are associated with signiﬁcantly more political
corruption than ﬁrst-term mayors, both in terms of the share of resources misappropriated and a
simple count of the number of corrupt irregularities found in the municipality. There are also signif-
icant diﬀerential eﬀects in several of the institutional features that aﬀect the extent of corruption,
such as in municipalities with a media source, a judiciary district, or are highly politically com-
petitive. Among municipalities with either a radio or a newspaper for instance, ﬁrst-term mayors
have similar corruptions levels as second-term mayors; a ﬁnding that supports a growing literature
on the importance of media on political accountability ((Stromberg 2003) and (Besley and Burgess
2002)).
While these empirical results provide valuable evidence in support of a fairly general political
agency model, our ﬁndings also highlight a critical complementarity that is absent in many of these
theoretical models. Second-term mayors, while more corrupt, are also better providers of public
goods. Consequently, it maybe the case that voters are willing to accept some amount of corruption
in exchange for a more experienced mayor that is able to provide a higher level of public goods.
Finally, this paper contributes to the discussion of the costs and beneﬁts of decentralization
in developing countries. Although we cannot determine whether decentralization has increased
overall corruption in Brazil, the fact that it has undoubtedly increased corruption at the local level
places an important emphasis on trying to understand how local institutions aﬀect corruption. Our
ﬁndings provide some preliminary evidence that local institution that promote accountability and
oversight may not only reduce political corruption but will minimize the adverse incentives that
term limits seem to create.
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29Table 2: Comparison of the irregularities found between municipalities with a ﬁrst-term mayor and
a second-term mayor
Municipalities with a
First-term mayor Second-term mayor Diﬀerence
Proportion of municipalities 0.547 0.453 0.094
Number of Irregularities
Diversion of funds 0.593 0.800 -0.207
(0.074) (0.131) (0.151)
Illegal Procurement 0.871 1.133 -0.262
(0.097) (0.119) (0.153)*
Over-invoicing 0.036 0.052 -0.016
(0.013) (0.020) (0.024)
Poor administration 1.338 1.051 0.287
(0.107) (0.131) (0.169)*
Failure to spend allocated budget 0.084 0.050 0.034
(0.033) (0.021) (0.039)
Incomplete public work 0.232 0.232 0.000
(0.039) (0.042) (0.057)
Non-existent council 0.485 0.391 0.095
(0.069) (0.059) (0.091)
Clientelism 0.043 0.043 0.000
(0.013) (0.014) (0.019)
Mismanagement of social program 0.449 0.405 0.045
(0.050) (0.053) (0.073)
Abandoned project 0.064 0.060 0.004
(0.018) (0.018) (0.026)
Corruption Indicator 1.500 1.985 -0.485
(0.140) (0.219) (0.260)*
Share of Total Resources Audited
Diversion of funds 0.018 0.022 -0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Illegal Procurement 0.035 0.066 -0.031
(0.005) (0.015) (0.016)*
Over-invoicing 0.000 0.002 -0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Failure to spend allocated budget 0.002 0.005 -0.004
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Incomplete public work 0.012 0.012 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Corruption Indicator 0.053 0.090 -0.037
(0.007) (0.017) (0.018)**
• Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
• * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%
30Table 3: Comparison of the main municipal characteristics between municipalities with a ﬁrst-term
mayor and a second-term mayor
Municipalities with a
First-term mayor Second-term mayor Diﬀerence
Mayor Characteristics
Male (1/0) 0.963 0.957 0.007
(0.012) (0.017) (0.021)
Education level 5.954 6.088 -0.134
(0.177) (0.198) (0.266)
Age 48.005 46.349 1.656
(0.788) (0.904) (1.199)
Married (1/0) 3.011 3.155 -0.144
(0.116) (0.115) (0.163)
Win margin 0.126 0.196 -0.070
(0.011) (0.017) (0.020)**
Municipal Characteristics
Population in logarithms 9.545 9.554 -0.009
(0.088) (0.117) (0.146)
Area (km) 100045.7 123090.9 -23045.1
(18430.5) (22225.8) (28873.4)
Urban population (%) 0.646 0.591 0.055
(0.020) (0.026) (0.032)
Literate population (%) 8263.345 7917.189 346.155
(81.339) (113.415) (139.567)*
Per Capita Income 220.461 193.443 27.019
(8.666) (9.423) (12.801)*
Gini 0.535 0.529 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Judiciary district (1/0) 0.523 0.477 0.047
(0.045) (0.050) (0.067)
Radio (1/0) 0.551 0.505 0.046
(0.044) (0.050) (0.067)
Newspaper (1/0) 0.861 0.861 -0.001
(0.030) (0.034) (0.045)
Total resources audited (R$) 4,138,580.0 4,787,749.0 -649,169.0
(523287.5) (619310.8) (810787.1)
• Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
• ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
• All together we compared the means of 46 characteristics of the municipality. The characteristics that are
not shown in the table include: indicators for whether there exists a shanty-town, a civil defense, municipal
guards, small-claims court, computerized treasury, computerized budget, computerized payroll, computerized
health data, computerized education data; 15 diﬀerent types of organic laws concerning such items as the
budget, zoning, and tax exemptions; the number of councils, the proportion of regulated councils, share of
budget devoted to public employment, and the size of the budget in 1999,2000, and 2001. Of these other
characteristics only the existence of a law specifying construction in public spaces and computerized health
data were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at a 5 percent level of conﬁdence.
31Table 4: Reelection incentives and the share of total resources associated with corruption
Dependent variable: Share of resource associated with corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Second-term 0.034 0.039 0.038 0.04
[0.018]* [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.020]**
Male mayor -0.032 -0.031 -0.054
[0.042] [0.041] [0.041]
Education of mayor -0.007 -0.007 -0.008
[0.004]* [0.004]* [0.005]
Married mayor -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
Age of mayor -0.001 -0.001 0
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Urban population (%) 0.096 0.102 0.088
[0.053]* [0.051]** [0.058]
Literate population (%) -0.234 -0.238 -0.171
[0.121]* [0.123]* [0.141]
Log population -0.009 0.004 -0.002
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Number of eﬀective candidates -0.001 -0.001 0.001
in 2000 mayor elections [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Log per capita income 0.012 0.028 0.045
[0.036] [0.036] [0.038]
Gini -0.126 -0.08 0.025
[0.101] [0.100] [0.119]
Judiciary district -0.014 -0.021
[0.016] [0.019]






Treasury computerized -0.037 -0.039
[0.038] [0.045]
Party aﬃliation intercepts N Y Y Y
State intercepts N N N Y
Observations 367 367 367 367
R-squared 0.02 0.15 0.17 0.22
Notes:
• Robust standard errors are reported in the brackets.
• * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
32Table 5: Reelection incentives and the incidences of corruption
Dependent variable: Number of Irregularities associated with corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Second-term 0.484 0.534 0.516 0.563 0.555
[0.267]* [0.213]** [0.204]** [0.205]*** [0.228]**
Male mayor -0.182 -0.219 -0.253
[0.366] [0.341] [0.332]
Education of mayor -0.085 -0.082 -0.08
[0.051]* [0.051] [0.058]
Married mayor 0.005 0.021 0.003
[0.069] [0.068] [0.066]
Age of mayor -0.005 -0.006 -0.001
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011]
Urban population (%) 0.182 0.071 -0.091
[0.499] [0.513] [0.581]
Literate population (%) -2.264 -2.222 -1.951
[1.499] [1.561] [1.916]
Log population 0.215 0.235 0.124
[0.112]* [0.119]** [0.127]
Number of eﬀective candidates 0.054 0.124 0.144
in 2000 mayor elections [0.167] [0.169] [0.163]
Log per capita income 0.015 0.106 0.528
[0.361] [0.364] [0.435]
Gini -0.073 -0.019 1.2
[1.326] [1.254] [1.388]
Judiciary district 0.201 0.138
[0.216] [0.234]






Treasury computerized 0.382 0.348
[0.291] [0.264]
Number of Irregularities 0.555 0.473 0.482 0.452
[0.086]*** [0.094]*** [0.097]*** [0.098]***
Party aﬃliation intercepts N N Y Y Y
State intercepts N N N N Y
Observations 367 367 367 367 367
R-squared 0.02 0.39 0.5 0.51 0.56
Notes:
• Robust standard errors are in brackets.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 7: Heterogeneity of the eﬀects of reelection incentives on political corruption
Dependent variable: Share of resources associated with corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Second-term 0.072 0.112 0.073 0.068

















Observations 367 367 367 367
R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17
Notes:
• Robust standard errors.
• * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
• Each regression controls for population size, area, urban, literacy rate, and electoral competition, Gini, and
per capita income.
35Table 8: Reelection incentives and the incidences of poor administration
Dependent variable: Number of Irregularities associated poor administration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Second-term -0.536 -0.504 -0.476 -0.488 -0.414
[0.226]** [0.202]** [0.191]** [0.193]** [0.208]**
Male mayor 0.696 0.738 0.678
[0.363]* [0.346]** [0.331]**
Education of mayor 0.063 0.058 0.06
[0.047] [0.047] [0.055]
Married mayor 0.012 0.001 0.027
[0.068] [0.067] [0.064]
Age of mayor 0.01 0.01 0.008
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011]
Urban population (%) -0.14 -0.051 -0.176
[0.489] [0.504] [0.554]
Literate population (%) 2.454 2.64 3.017
[1.397]* [1.441]* [1.780]*
Log population -0.225 -0.247 -0.115
[0.109]** [0.118]** [0.129]
Number of eﬀective candidates -0.227 -0.265 -0.288
in 2000 mayor elections [0.180] [0.182] [0.181]
Log per capita income -0.065 -0.095 -0.27
[0.341] [0.350] [0.426]
Gini 0.822 0.559 -0.485
[1.289] [1.251] [1.351]
Judiciary district -0.013 -0.033
[0.217] [0.230]






Treasury computerized -0.458 -0.439
[0.287] [0.263]*
Number of Irregularities 0.356 0.441 0.441 0.472
[0.075]*** [0.080]*** [0.082]*** [0.084]***
Party aﬃliation intercepts N N Y Y Y
State intercepts N N N N Y
Observations 367 367 367 367 367
R-squared 0.03 0.23 0.37 0.38 0.45
Notes:
• Robust standard errors are in brackets.
• * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
36Table 9: Reelection incentives and the incidences of poor administration: Robust
Dependent variable: Number of Irregularities associated poor administration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Second-term -0.609 -0.666 -0.507 -0.497 -0.454
[0.266]** [0.234]*** [0.220]** [0.223]** [0.214]**
Male mayor 0.917 0.926 1.027
[0.378]** [0.357]** [0.313]***
Education of mayor 0.124 0.116 0.134
[0.056]** [0.059]* [0.068]*
Married mayor 0.063 0.069 0.073
[0.068] [0.069] [0.068]
Age of mayor 0.011 0.009 0.01
[0.012] [0.012] [0.013]
Urban population (%) 0.067 0.114 0.172
[0.586] [0.638] [0.707]
Literate population (%) 0.117 -0.057 -0.358
[1.709] [1.705] [1.973]
Log population -0.384 -0.308 -0.193
[0.130]*** [0.140]** [0.176]
Number of eﬀective candidates -0.354 -0.371 -0.467
in 2000 mayor elections [0.189]* [0.195]* [0.206]**
Log per capita income 0.41 0.651 0.336
[0.386] [0.408] [0.545]
Gini 1.023 0.856 -0.142
[1.588] [1.548] [1.730]
Judiciary district -0.076 -0.097
[0.247] [0.272]






Treasury computerized -0.498 -0.457
[0.325] [0.291]
Number of Irregularities 0.372 0.468 0.464 0.46
[0.104]*** [0.106]*** [0.105]*** [0.108]***
Party aﬃliation intercepts N N Y Y Y
State intercepts N N N N Y
Observations 246 246 246 246 246
R-squared 0.03 0.24 0.45 0.46 0.52
Notes:
• Robust standard errors are in brackets.
• * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
37Table 10: Reelection incentives and the share of total resources associated with corruption: Ro-
bustness
Dependent variable: Share of resources associated with corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Second-term 0.029 0.035 0.034 0.037
[0.020] [0.020]* [0.019]* [0.021]*
Number of irregularities
Poor administration -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Misuse of social program -0.021 -0.019 -0.021 -0.02
[0.011]* [0.011]* [0.012]* [0.013]
Nonexistent council -0.015 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013
[0.016] [0.015] [0.014] [0.015]
Unﬁnished Public Works -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003
[0.012] [0.013] [0.014] [0.015]
Observations 367 367 367 367
R-squared 0.04 0.16 0.19 0.23
Notes:
• Robust standard errors.
• * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
• In addition to the controls presented in this table, the regressions presented columns 1 through 4 control for
the same respective variables presented in columns 1 through 4 of tables 4 and 5.
388 Annex
39Table 11: Reelection incentives and the share of total resources associated with corruption: TOBIT
model
Dependent variable: Share of resource associated with corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Second-term 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.033
[0.015]** [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.015]**
Male mayor -0.035 -0.035 -0.052
[0.032] [0.032] [0.033]
Education of mayor -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
[0.003]* [0.003]* [0.004]*
Married mayor -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Age of mayor 0 0 0
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Urban population (%) 0.059 0.064 0.051
[0.042] [0.040] [0.042]
Literate population (%) -0.2 -0.217 -0.162
[0.091]** [0.091]** [0.102]
Log population 0.002 0.015 0.01
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Number of eﬀective candidates 0.003 0.003 0.004
in 2000 mayor elections [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Log per capita income 0.004 0.017 0.037
[0.026] [0.026] [0.027]
Gini -0.117 -0.062 -0.004
[0.090] [0.089] [0.101]
Judiciary district -0.017 -0.024
[0.013] [0.015]






Treasury computerized -0.018 -0.021
[0.027] [0.030]
Party aﬃliation intercepts N Y Y Y
State intercepts N N N Y
Observations 367 367 367 367
Pseudo Log-likelihood 4840 12255 13811 16760
Notes:
• Robust standard errors are reported in the brackets.
• * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
• The marginal eﬀects reported for the Tobit model are conditional on censoring, i.e.
∂E(y|x,y>0)
∂x .
40Table 12: Reelection Incentives and the Incidence of Corruption: Poisson Model
Dependent variable: The number of irregularities associated with corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Second-term 0.484 0.464 0.367 0.418 0.402
[0.266]* [0.169]*** [0.154]** [0.150]*** [0.148]***
Male mayor -0.141 -0.142 -0.318
[0.259] [0.231] [0.231]
Education of mayor -0.048 -0.052 -0.057
[0.037] [0.035] [0.036]
Married mayor 0.041 0.052 0.025
[0.048] [0.047] [0.041]
Age of mayor -0.002 -0.004 0.001
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Urban population (%) 0.164 0.069 -0.041
[0.397] [0.393] [0.420]
Literate population (%) -1.511 -1.387 -1.548
[1.045] [1.117] [1.244]
Log population 0.189 0.216 0.145
[0.082]** [0.090]** [0.094]
Number of eﬀective candidates -0.004 0.043 0.075
in 2000 mayor elections [0.158] [0.154] [0.138]
Log per capita income -0.173 -0.041 0.327
[0.297] [0.317] [0.349]
Gini -0.221 -0.234 0.415
[1.110] [1.058] [1.011]
Judiciary district 0.212 0.117
[0.162] [0.166]






Treasury computerized 0.145 0.038
[0.179] [0.182]
Number of Irregularities 0.339 0.269 0.28 0.255
[0.028]*** [0.037]*** [0.038]*** [0.035]***
Party aﬃliation intercepts N N Y Y Y
State intercepts N N N N Y
Observations 367 367 367 367 367
Pseudo likelihood -188130 -159718 -150186 -148806 -144272
Notes:
• Robust standard errors are in brackets.
• * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
41